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Abstract
Aggregate signatures allow anyone to combine different signatures signed by different signers on
different messages into a single short signature. An ideal aggregate signature scheme is an identity-based
aggregate signature (IBAS) scheme that supports full aggregation since it can reduce the total transmitted
data by using an identity string as a public key and anyone can freely aggregate different signatures.
Constructing a secure IBAS scheme that supports full aggregation in bilinear maps is an important open
problem. Recently, Yuan et al. proposed an IBAS scheme with full aggregation in bilinear maps and
claimed its security in the random oracle model under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. In
this paper, we show that there exists an efficient forgery attacker on their IBAS scheme and their security
proof has a serious flaw.
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1 Introduction
Aggregate signature schemes allow anyone to combine n different signatures on different n messages signed
by different n signers into a single short aggregate signature. The main advantage of aggregate signature
schemes is to reduce the communication and storage overhead of signatures by compressing these signatures
into a single signature. The application of aggregate signature schemes includes secure routing protocols,
public-key infrastructure systems, and sensor networks. Boneh et al. [5] proposed the first full aggregate
signature scheme in which anyone can combine different signatures in bilinear groups and proved its security
in the random oracle model. After that, Lysyanskaya et al. [14] constructed a sequential aggregate signature
scheme such that a signature can be combined in sequential order, and Gentry and Ramzan [7] proposed
a synchronized aggregate signature scheme such that all signers should share synchronized information.
There are many other aggregate signature schemes with different properties [1, 4, 8, 9, 11–13, 16].
Although aggregate signature schemes can reduce the size of signatures by aggregation, they usually
cannot reduce the total amount of transmitted data significantly since a verifier should retrieve all public
keys of the signers. Therefore, reducing the size of public keys is also an important issue in aggregate
signature schemes [11, 12, 16]. An ideal solution for this problem is to use an identity-based aggregate
signature (IBAS) scheme since it uses an already known identity string as the public key of a user [7].
However, there is only one IBAS scheme with full aggregation that was proposed by Hohenberger et al. [9]
in multilinear maps. The multilinear map is an attractive tool for cryptographic constructions, but it is
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currently impractical since it’s basis is a leveled homomorphic encryption scheme [6]. There are some IBAS
schemes in bilinear maps, but these IBAS schemes only support sequential aggregation or synchronized
aggregation [4, 7, 8]. Therefore, construction an IBAS scheme with full aggregation in bilinear maps is an
important open problem.
The main reason for the difficulty of devising an IBAS scheme with full aggregation is that it seems not
easy to find a way to aggregate the randomness of all signers in which each randomness of a signer is used
to hide the private key of each signer in a signing process [7]. For this reason, current IBAS schemes only
support synchronized aggregation or sequential aggregation to aggregate the randomness of all signers [4,7].
Additionally, designing a secure IBAS scheme is not a easy task since even the original version of Boldyreva
et al.’s IBAS scheme [3] was broken by Hwang et al. [10] and then it was corrected later. Recently, Yuan
et al. proposed an IBAS scheme with full aggregation in bilinear maps and claimed it security in random
oracle models [17]. The authors first proposed an IBS scheme in bilinear maps and constructed an IBAS
scheme from the IBS scheme. To prove the security their IBS scheme, the authors claimed that the security
of their IBS scheme can be proven under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption by using
Forking Lemma in the random oracle model.
In this paper, we show that the IBS and IBAS schemes of Yuan et al. are not secure at all. First, we show
that there exists a universal forgery attack against the IBS scheme of Yuan et al. by using two signatures.
This forgery attack also applies to their IBAS scheme. One may wonder that our forgery attack contradicts
their claims of the security of the schemes. To solve this, we next show that the security proof of Yuan et
al.’s IBS scheme has a serious flaw. The security proof of the IBS scheme essentially use the fact that two
signatures that are obtained by using Forking Lemma have the same randomness in signatures. However,
we show that the forged signatures of an adversary cannot satisfy this condition since the signature of Yuan
et al.’s IBS scheme is publicly re-randomizable.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review bilinear groups and the IBS and IBAS
schemes of Yuan et al. In Section 3, we present a universal forgery against the IBS scheme. In Section 4,
we analyze the security proof of Yuan et al.’s IBS scheme and show that the proof has a serious flaw.
2 The IBAS Scheme of Yuan et al.
In this section, we review bilinear groups and the IBS and IBAS schemes of Yuan et al. [17].
2.1 Bilinear Groups and Complexity Assumptions
Let G and GT be two multiplicative cyclic groups of same prime order p and g be a generator of G. The
bilinear map e : G×G→GT has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u,v ∈G and ∀a,b ∈ Zp, e(ua,vb) = e(u,v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃g such that e(g,g) has order p, that is, e(g,g) is a generator of GT .
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operations in G and GT as well as the bilinear map e are all
efficiently computable. Furthermore, we assume that the description of G and GT includes generators of G
and GT respectively.
Assumption 2.1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman, CDH). Let (p,G,GT ,e) be a description of the bilinear
group of prime order p. Let g be generators of subgroups G. The CDH assumption is that if the challenge
tuple D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e),g,ga,gb
)
is given, no PPT algorithm A can output gab ∈ G with more than a
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negligible advantage. The advantage of A is defined as AdvCDHA (λ ) = Pr[A(D) = gab] where the probability
is taken over random choices of a,b ∈ Zp.
2.2 The Identity-Based Signature Scheme
The IBS scheme consists of Setup, GenKey, Sign, and Verify algorithms. The IBS scheme of Yuan et
al. [17] is described as follows:
Setup(1λ ): This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1λ . It generates bilinear groups G,GT of
prime order p. Let g be a random generator of G. It chooses random exponents s1,s2 ∈ Z∗p and
two cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0,1}∗ → G and H2 : {0,1}∗ → Z∗p. It outputs a master key
MK = (s1,s2) and public parameters PP =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g, g1 = gs1 ,g2 = gs2 , H1,H2
)
.
GenKey(ID,MK,PP): This algorithm takes as input an identity ID∈ {0,1}∗, the master key MK = (s1,s2),
and the public parameters PP. It outputs a private key SKID =
(
D1 = H1(ID)s1 , D2 = H1(ID)s2
)
.
Sign(M,SKID,PP): This algorithm takes as input a message M ∈ {0,1}∗, a private key SKID = (D1,D2),
and the public parameters PP. It selects a random exponent r ∈ Z∗p and computes h = H2(ID‖M). It
outputs a signature σ =
(
U = gr, V = Dh1 ·gr1, W = D2 ·gr2
)
.
Verify(σ , ID,M,PP): This algorithm takes as input a signature σ = (U,V,W ), an identity ID ∈ {0,1}∗, a
message M{0,1}∗, and the public parameters PP. It computes h = H(ID‖M) and checks whether
e(V,g) ?= e(H1(ID)h ·U,g1) and e(W,g)
?
= e(H1(ID) ·U,g2). If both equations hold, then it outputs 1.
Otherwise, it outputs 0.
Claim 2.2 ( [17]). The above IBS scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks in the
random oracle model if the CDH assumption holds.
Remark 2.3. The original IBS and IBAS schemes of Yuan et al. is described in the addictive notation in
bilinear groups. However, in this paper, we use the multiplicative notation instead of the addictive notation
for the notational simplicity.
Remark 2.4. The signature of Yuan et al.’s IBS scheme is publicly re-randomizable. If σ = (U,V,W ) is a
valid signature, then a re-randomized signature σ ′ = (U ·gr′ ,V ·gr′1 ,W ·gr
′
2 ) is also a valid one where r′ is a
random exponent in Z∗p.
2.3 The Identity-Based Aggregate Signature Scheme
The IBAS scheme consists of Setup, GenKey, Sign, Verify, Aggregate, and AggVerify algorithms. The
Setup, GenKey, Sign, and Verify algorithms of Yuan et al.’s IBAS scheme is the same as those of their IBS
scheme. The IBAS scheme of Yuan et al. [17] is described as follows:
Aggregate(σ1 ,σ2,S1,S2,PP): This algorithm takes a input a signature σ1 = (U1,V1,W1) on a multiset
S1 = {(ID1,1,M1,1), . . . ,(ID1,n1 ,M1,n1)} of identity and message pairs, a signature σ2 = (U2,V2,W2)
on a multiset S2 = {(ID2,1,M2,1), . . . ,(ID2,n2 ,M2,n2)} of identity and message pairs, and the public
parameters PP. It outputs an aggregate signature σ =
(
U =U1 ·U2,V =V1 ·V2,W =W1 ·W2
)
on the
multiset S = S1∪S2.
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AggVerify(σ ,S,PP): This algorithm takes as input an aggregate signature σ = (U,V,W ), a multiset S =
{(ID1,M1), . . . ,(IDn,Mn)} of identity and message pairs, and the public parameters PP. It computes
hi = H(IDi‖Mi) for i = 1, . . . ,n and checks whether e(V,g)
?
= e(∏ni=1 H1(IDi)hi ·U,g1) and e(W,g) ?=
e(∏ni=1 H1(IDi) ·U,g2). If both equations hold, then it outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
Claim 2.5 ( [17]). The above IBAS scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks in the
random oracle model if the underlying IBS scheme is unforgeable under chosen message attacks.
3 Forgery Attacks on the IBAS Scheme
In this section, we show that the IBS and IBAS schemes of Yuan et al. are not secure at all by presenting
an efficient forgery algorithm. In fact, our forgery algorithm is universal since anyone who has two valid
signatures on the same identity with different messages can generate a forge signature on the same identity
with any message of its choice.
Lemma 3.1. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm F that can forge the IBS scheme
of Yuan et al. except negligible probability if F makes just two signature queries.
Proof. The basic idea of our forgery attack is that if a forger obtains two valid signature on an identity, then
a linear combination of these signatures can be another valid signature by carefully choosing scalar values.
A forgery algorithm F is described as follows:
1. F randomly selects a target identity ID∗ and two different messages M1 and M2. It obtains a signature
σ1 = (U1,V1,W1) on the pair (ID∗,M1) and a signature σ2 = (U2,V2,W2) on the pair (ID∗,M2) from
the signature oracle.
2. It randomly selects a target message M∗ for a forged signature. Next, it computes h1 = H2(ID∗‖M1),
h2 = H2(ID∗‖M2), and h∗ = H2(ID∗‖M∗). It computes two exponents δ1,δ2 that satisfy the following
equation
[
h1 h2
1 1
][
δ1
δ2
]
=
[
h∗
1
]
mod p.
Note that if h1 6= h2, then δ1,δ3 can be computed by using Linear Algebra since the determinant
h1−h2 of the left matrix is not zero.
3. Finally, F outputs a forged signature σ ∗ on the identity and message pair (ID∗,M∗) as
σ ∗ =
(
U∗ =Uδ11 ·U
δ2
2 , V
∗ =V δ11 ·V
δ2
2 , W
∗ =W δ11 ·W
δ2
2
)
.
To finish the proof, we should show that the forger F outputs a (forged) signature with non-negligible
probability and the forged signature passes the verification algorithm. We known that F always outputs a
signature if h1 6= h2. Because H2 is a collision-resistant hash function and M1 6= M2, we have that h1 6= h2
except negligible probability. Now we should show that the forged signature is correct by the verification
algorithm. Let r1,r2 be the randomness of σ1,σ2 respectively. The correctness of the forged signature is
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easily verified as follows
U∗ =Uδ11 ·U
δ2
2 = g
r1δ1+r2δ2 = gr
∗
,
V ∗ =V δ11 ·V
δ2
2 = (H1(ID
∗)s1h1 gr11 )
δ1 · (H1(ID∗)s1h2 gr21 )
δ2
= H1(ID∗)s1(h1δ1+h2δ2)gr1δ1+r2δ21 = H1(ID
∗)s1h
∗
gr
∗
1 ,
W ∗ =W δ11 ·W
δ2
2 = (H1(ID
∗)s2gr12 )
δ1 · (H1(ID∗)s2 gr22 )
δ2
= H1(ID∗)s2(δ1+δ2)gr1δ1+r2δ22 = H1(ID
∗)s2gr
∗
2
where the randomness of the forged signature is defined as r∗ = r1δ1 + r2δ2 mod p. This completes the
proof.
Corollary 3.2. There exists a PPT algorithm F that can forge the IBAS scheme of Yuan et al. except
negligible probability if F makes just two signature queries.
The proof of this corollary is trivial from the proof of the previous Lemma since the IBAS scheme uses
the IBS scheme as the underlying signature scheme. We omit the proof.
4 Our Analysis of the Security Proof
From the forgery attack in the previous section, it is evident that the IBS and IBAS schemes of Yuan et al.
are not secure. However, Yuan et al. claimed that their IBS scheme is secure in the random oracle model
under the CDH assumption by using Forking Lemma in [17]. In this section, we analyze the security proof
of Yuan et al. and show that there is a critical flaw in their security proof that uses Forking Lemma.
4.1 The Original Proof
In this subsection, we briefly review the security proof of Yuan et al.’s IBS scheme [17] that solves the CDH
problem by using Forking Lemma [2, 15].
Suppose there exists an adversary A that outputs a forged signature for the IBS scheme with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the CDH problem using A is given: a challenge tuple
D = ((p,G,GT ,e),g,ga,gb). Then B that interacts with A is described as follows:
Setup: B chooses a random exponent s2 ∈ Z∗p and maintains H1-list and H2-list for random oracles. It
implicitly sets s1 = a and publishes the public parameters PP =
(
(p,G,GT ,e),g, g1 = ga,g2 = gs2 , H1,H2
)
.
Hash Query: If this is an H1 hash query on an identity IDi, then B handles this query as follows: If the
identity IDi already appears in H1-list, then it responds with the value in the list. Otherwise, it picks a
random coin c ∈ {0,1} with Pr[c = 0] = δ for some δ and proceeds as follows: If c = 0, then it chooses
ti ∈ Z∗p and sets Qi = (gb)ti . If c = 1, then it chooses ti ∈ Z∗p and sets Qi = gti . Next, it adds (IDi, ti,c,Qi) to
H1-list and responds to A with H1(IDi) = Qi.
If this is an H2 hash query on an identity IDi and a message Mi, then B handles this query as follows:
If the tuple (IDi,Mi) already appears on H2-list, then it responds with the value in the list. Otherwise, it
randomly chooses hi ∈ Z∗p, add (IDi,Mi,hi) to H2-list, and responds with H2(IDi‖Mi) = hi.
Private-Key Query: B handles a private key query for an identity IDi as follows: It first retrieves (IDi, ti,c,Qi)
from the H1-list. If c = 0, then it aborts the simulation since it cannot create a private key. Otherwise, it
creates a private key SKIDi = (D1 = g
ti
1,D2 = g
ti
2) and responds to A with SKIDi .
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Signature Query: B handles a signature query on an identity IDi and a message Mi as follows: It randomly
chooses r′ ∈ Z∗p and computes h = H2(IDi‖Mi). Next, it responds to A with a signature σ =
(
U = gr′ ·
H1(IDi)−h, V = gr
′
1 , W = H1(IDi)s2 ·U s2
)
.
Output: A finally outputs a forged signature σ ∗ = (U∗,V ∗,W ∗) on an identity ID∗ and a message M∗.
To solve the CDH problem, B retrieves the tuple (ID∗, t∗,c∗,Q∗) from the H1-list. If c∗ 6= 0, then it
aborts since it cannot extract the CDH value. Otherwise, it obtains two valid signatures σ ∗1 = (U∗1 ,V ∗1 ,W ∗1 )
and σ ∗2 = (U∗2 ,V ∗2 ,W ∗2 ) on the same identity and message tuple (ID∗,M∗) such that U∗1 = U∗2 and h∗1 6= h∗2
by applying Forking Lemma. That is, it replays F with the same random tape but different choice of the
random oracle H2. If U∗1 =U∗2 , then we have the following equation
V ∗1 · (V ∗2 )−1 = H1(ID∗)s1h
∗
1 gs1r
∗
1 · (H1(ID
∗)s1h
∗
2 gs1r
∗
1 )
−1
= H1(ID∗)s1(h
∗
1−h∗2) = (gab)t
∗(h∗1−h∗2).
Thus, B can compute the CDH value as (V ∗1 · (V ∗2 )−1)1/(t
∗(h∗1−h∗2)) if h∗1 6= h∗2 mod p.
4.2 A Non-Extractable Forgery
To extract the CDH value from forged signatures by applying Forking Lemma, it is essential for the simulator
to obtains two valid signatures σ ∗1 and σ ∗2 such that U∗1 =U∗2 and h∗1 6= h∗2. By replaying a forgery with the
same random tape with different choice of random oracle H2, it is possible for a simulator to obtain two valid
signatures σ ∗1 = (U∗1 ,V ∗1 ,W ∗1 ) and σ ∗2 = (U∗2 ,V ∗2 ,W ∗2 ) with h∗1 6= h∗2 because of Forking Lemma. However,
we show that the probability of U∗1 =U∗2 is negligible for some clever forgery.
Lemma 4.1. If there is a PPT algorithm A that can forge the IBS scheme of Yuan et al., then there is another
PPT algorithm F that can forge the IBS scheme with almost the same probability except that the simulator
of Yuan et al. cannot extract the CDH value from the forged signatures of F .
Proof. The basic idea of this proof is that anyone can re-randomize the signature of Yuan et al.’s IBS scheme
by using the public parameters. In this case, even though a simulator use the same random tape for Forking
Lemma, a forgery output a forged signature σ ∗ on an identity ID∗ and a message M∗ after re-randomizing it
by using the information h∗ = H2(ID∗‖M∗). Let H ′ : {0,1}∗ →Zp be a collision resistant hash function that
is not modeled as the random oracle. A new forgery F that uses A as a sub-routine is described as follows:
1. F is first given PP and runs A by giving PP. F also handles the private key and signature queries of
A by using his own private key and signature oracles.
2. A finally outputs a forged signature σ ′ = (U ′,V ′,W ′) on an identity ID∗ and a message M∗.
3. F computes h∗ = H2(ID∗‖M∗) and h′ = H ′(U ′‖h∗), and then it re-randomizes the forged signature as
σ ∗ =
(
U∗ =U ′ ·gh
′
, V ∗ =V ′ ·gh
′
1 , W ∗ =W ′ ·gh
′
2
)
.
4. Finally, F outputs σ ∗ = (U∗,V ∗,W ∗) as the forged signature on an identity ID∗ and M∗.
To finish the proof, we should show that the forged signature of F is correct and the simulator of Yuan
et al. cannot extract the CDH value from the forged signatures by using Forking Lemma. Let r′ be the
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randomness of σ ′. The correctness of the forged signature is easily checked as follows
U∗ =U ′ ·gh
′
= gr
′+h′ = gr
∗
,
V ∗ =V ′ ·gh
′
1 = H1(ID
∗)s1h
∗
gr
′+h′
1 = H1(ID
∗)s1h
∗
gr
∗
1 ,
W ∗ =W ′ ·gh
′
2 = H1(ID
∗)s2 gr
′+h′
2 = H1(ID
∗)s2gr
∗
2
where h∗ = H2(ID∗‖M∗) and r∗ = r′+h′. To extract the CDH value from the forged signature of F by using
Forking Lemma, the simulator of Yuan et al. should obtain two valid signatures σ ∗1 = (U∗1 ,V ∗1 ,W ∗1 ) and
σ ∗2 = (U∗2 ,V ∗2 ,W ∗2 ) on the same identity and message pair (ID∗,M∗) such that U∗1 = U∗2 and h∗1 6= h∗2 after
replaying F with the same random tape but different choices of the hash oracle H2. Let σ ∗1 = (U∗1 ,V ∗1 ,W ∗1 )
and σ ∗2 = (U∗2 ,V ∗2 ,W ∗2 ) be the two valid signatures obtained from F by using Forking Lemma and σ ′1 =
(U ′1,V ′1,W ′1) and σ ′2 = (U ′2,V ′2,W ′2) be the original signatures before the re-randomization of F . If h∗1 6= h∗2,
then h′1 6= h′2 except negligible probability since H ′ is a collision-resistance hash function and the inputs of
this hash function are different. From h′1 6= h′2, we have U∗1 6=U∗2 except negligible probability since U ′1 and
U ′2 are re-randomized with difference values gh
′
1 and gh′2 respectively. Therefore, the event that the simulator
obtains two valid signatures such that U∗1 = U∗2 and h∗1 6= h∗2 by using Forking Lemma only occurs with
negligible probability. This completes our proof.
4.3 Discussions
From the above analysis, we know that the original IBS scheme of Yuan et al. cannot be proven secure
under the CDH assumption by applying Forking Lemma since the signature is publicly re-randomizable. To
fix this problem, we may modify the IBS scheme to compute h = H2(U‖ID‖M) instead of h = H2(ID‖M)
where U is the first element of a signature. In this case, the signature of the modified IBS scheme is not
re-randomizable since U is given to the input of H2. Note that our forgery attack in the previous section
also does not work in this modified IBS scheme. However, this modified IBS scheme does not lead to an
IBAS scheme since each U in individual signatures cannot be aggregated. Note that if each U is aggregated,
then a verifier cannot check the validity of an aggregate signature since each U is not given in the aggregate
signature. Therefore, there is no easy fix to solve the problem.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that the IBS and IBAS schemes of Yuan et al. are not secure at all. We first
presented an efficient forgery attack on the IBS scheme and their security proof of the IBS scheme has a
serious flaw. The IBAS scheme is also not secure since the security of their IBAS scheme is based on the
security of their IBS scheme. Therefore, constructing an IBAS scheme with full aggregation in bilinear
maps is still left as an important open problem.
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